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The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate a research methodology to prevent 
chemical product failures. This methodology extends the risk in early design (RED) 
method for prevention of failure in electromechanical products to include products with 
chemical subsystems. Inclusion of this domain is demanded by the ever-growing 
semiconductor and energy industries. The RED method was extended by first identifying 
principal chemical failure modes and adding them to the failure mode taxonomy. The 
RED database was then augmented with historical failures of products that included 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
This research presents a methodology to analyze risk during the conceptual design 
stage for products with substantial chemical components. This work is motivated by the 
continuing growth of the semiconductor and energy industries. 
Safety, performance, and reliability are principal concerns of any industry. These 
concerns are particularly important to industries that rely on chemicals or chemical 
processes because most chemical-human interaction is undesirable. Most process 
chemicals have a negative impact on the human biochemical system, and many are 
documented carcinogens or toxins; therefore, accidents involving these products are 
particularly deadly. The Bhopal disaster is a dramatic example. This incident took place 
at a Union Carbide pesticide plant in the Indian city of Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, on 
December 3
rd
, 1984. The plant released an estimated 42 tons of toxic methyl isocyanate 
(MIC) gas, exposing more than 500,000 people to MIC and other chemicals. The first 
official death toll was 2,259. The government of Madhya Pradesh later confirmed that 
total of 8,000 to 10,000 died within 72 hours, and 25,000 have since died from gas-
related diseases (Broughton, 2005). To address these concerns, the industry is currently 
pushing to include safety and risk assessment in the early stages of conceptual design 
(Uder, Stone and Tumer, 2004). Performance and safety problems can be eliminated with 
a thorough understanding of potential failure modes and their causes. Such an 
understanding can be gained from an understanding of prior product failures. 
Past failures involving chemicals or chemical processes can be efficiently 
cataloged using the RED method. Relevant information includes a description of the 
failure, as well as its causes and effects. Such information is available from a variety of 
sources such as academic journals (e.g. Physical Chemistry Chemical Physics journal, 
American Physical Society, and Journal of Power Sources), The Mary K. O’Connor 
Process Safety Center, and the Sandia National Laboratories web page. 
To make use of the information available from historical failures during 
conceptual product design, the RED method links failures need to product function 
(Grantham Lough, Stone and Tumer, 2009).The use of function models improves the 
ability to explore potential risk early in the conceptual design, independent of form and 
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specific solutions. Once the information has been stored in the RED knowledge base, a 
risk analysis can be performed quickly, and without great expense, even by inexperienced 
designers.  
A standard taxonomy is necessary to catalogue historical failures and to prevent 
ambiguity in describing them. Such a taxonomy provides designers with a repeatable and 
reusable vocabulary to work with (Tumer and Stone, 2003). The failure mode taxonomy 
developed by Tumer and Stone does not presently account for chemical failure modes. 
This research has developed a chemical failure mode addendum to the present failure 
mode taxonomy. This modification will allow novice designers and engineers to quickly 
generate chemical design risk by linking historical product failures to functionality. 
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2.  RELATED WORK 
2.1. CURRENT PRACTICES FOR RISK INVOLVING CHEMICAL FAILURE 
Current techniques to evaluate the potential for chemical failure include failure modes 
and effects analysis (FMEA), fault tree analysis (FTA) and hazard and operability studies 
(HAZOPS).  
FMEA is a specific methodology to evaluate a system, design, process, or service 
for possible failure mechanisms (Price, 1996). It is particularly suited for analyzing 
potential reliability problems early in the development cycle where such issues are more 
easily overcome. There are several types of FMEAs; some are used much more often 
than others. System FMEA focuses on global system functions; design FMEA focuses on 
components and subsystems, and process FMEA focuses on manufacturing and assembly 
processes. 
One benefit of FMEA is early identification and elimination of potential product 
and process failure modes. This method prioritizes product and process deficiencies and 
captures engineering and organization knowledge. FMEA emphasizes problem 
prevention and documents risks and the actions taken to mitigate them (Price, 1996). 
Unfortunately, FMEAs are cumbersome and time consuming. Bluvband and 
Zilberberg (1998) have pointed out that FMEAs identify too many relationships between 
failure modes, effects, causes, current controls, and recommended actions. According to 
Montgomery et al. (1996), the several entries in the FMEA worksheet make FMEA 
reports difficult to understand, produce, and maintain. In addition, FMEAs require 
detailed knowledge of products and processes, and thus, the novice engineer cannot 
easily use them. Another shortcoming of FMEAs is that they require engineers and 
designers to estimates occurrence, severity, and detection based on experience. 
Montgomery (1996) noted that the brainstorming process for FMEA is lengthy, time 
consuming, and, prone error. 
FTA is a logical, structured process that can identify potential causes of system 
failure before the failures actually occur. Fault trees are powerful design tools that can 
help ensure that product performance objectives are met. (Fault Tree Analysis, 2009) 
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FTA permits identification of possible system reliability or safety problems at 
design time. FTA can assess system reliability or safety during operation and improve 
understanding of a system. It identifies components that may require testing or more 
rigorous scrutiny for quality assurance. They help identify root causes of equipment 
failures (Henley and Kumamoto, 1981). 
Although fault trees may reveal human error, they do little to determine the 
underlying cause. FTA requires detailed knowledge of system design, construction and 
operation. They are not suitable for assessing normal operations and may become very 
large and complex (Henley and Kumamoto, 1981). Significant training and experience 
are necessary to use this technique properly, and even once the technique has been 
mastered, application remains time consuming. FTA is not practical for systems with 
many safety-critical failures. 
HAZOPS have been used over approximately four decades for identifying 
potential hazards and operability problems caused by deviations from the design intent of 
both new and existing process plants (Tyler, Crawley and Preston, 2008). The HAZOPS 
procedure requires a full description of a process and systematic questioning of every part 
of the system to determine how deviations from the design intent can arise. Once 
deviations are identified, an assessment is made to determine whether the deviations and 
their consequences can have a negative effect on the safe and efficient operation of the 
plant. If necessary, action is then taken to remedy the situation. This is the method 
followed by the Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center (Mary Kay O'Connor 
Process Safety Center, 2009). 
The HAZOPS process is a systematic examination and therefore very thorough. 
The team approach to HAZOPS makes the process multidisciplinary; allowing an in-
depth study of risk (Kletz, 2006) The HAZOPS team relies on operational experience and 
historical performance. The process covers safety as well as operations and may indicate 
solutions to the problems identified. HAZOPS consider operational procedures and 
human errors. 
A disadvantage of HAZOPS is their focus on single events rather than 
combinations of possible events. Their reliance on guide words allows HAZOPS to 
overlook some hazards not related to those words. From an engineering standpoint, 
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HAZOPS are qualitative; they do not attempt to quantify either the occurrence or severity 
of hazards (Neogy, et al., 1996). In addition, extensive training is essential for optimum 
results, especially for the facilitator. HAZOPS are typically time consuming and thus 
expensive. 
All the methods currently available have three drawbacks: First they require 
experienced designers or engineers. Second, they are time consuming. Third, their results 
rely on the assumptions of designers and engineers regarding severity and occurrence. 
The methodology presented here addresses these issues by allowing the novice engineers 
and designers to quickly and repeatedly analyze risk for new product or process involving 
chemical components by drawing from historical failure data and using consistent 
terminology. This method is based on RED method developed by Grantham Lough 
(Grantham Lough, Stone and Tumer, 2009). 
 
 
2.2  THE RISK IN EARLY DESIGN (RED) METHOD 
The RED method maps a product’s functions to potential failures and determines 
the likelihood, and consequence of failure based on relevant cataloged historical failure 
information. Table 2.1 shows the consequence and likelihood calculations used in RED. 




EC x CF = EF (1)  Equation (1) 
 
 
Where EC represents the function-component matrix, CF represents the component-
failure matrix and EF is the function-failure matrix. 
Efforts to examine multiple electromechanical products led to the development of 
some basic heuristics that assume a fully populated database of related historical failures. 




System Level: A stage of design that considers the product as a whole. 
Subsystem Level: A stage of design that considers subsystems or smaller pieces 
of the product. 
Human centric product: Product requiring human input for its operation. 
Unmanned product: Product requiring no direct human interaction during 
operation. 
The summary of the heuristics is presented in Table 2.2. 
RED uses a matrix-based risk assessment to identify specific function-failure 
mode combinations that have occurred historically and to quantify that information into 
consequence and likelihood (Grantham Lough, Stone and Tumer, 2009). Since this 
method employs documented historical function-failure combinations, novice designers 
and engineers can implement it to ascertain potential risks. Also, the historical failures 
catalogued in RED remove personal bias by providing a database with which to 
determine consequence and likelihood values. (Grantham Lough, Stone and Tumer, 
2009). RED can even be applied in the early conceptual phases of product design. 
Avoiding risks at this early stage is less costly because the physical form has not yet been 
determined 
RED manipulates risks so that the risks are compatible with the risk fever chart 
(Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, 1999). The RED method is maps risks so that 
both consequence and likelihood have integer values ranging from one to five. The risk 
fever chart plots consequence values against the likelihood of values. It is easy to 
decipher because risk elements are classified into three categories: high-risk, moderate-
risk, and low-risk, each represented by a different color. The fever chart is populated with 
risk data produced by the RED method and plotted according to values for consequence 






Table 2.1. RED Likelihood and Consequence Mapping Summary (Grantham Lough, 








Grantham Lough, Stone, and Tumer (2009) illustrate RED risk assessment 
performed on a functional model of a thermal control subsystem. Thousands of anomaly 
reports for various missions and subsystems are contained in the problem/failure 
reporting (P/FR) database at Jet Propulsion Laboratory (Grantham Lough, Stone and 
Tumer, 2009). A Thermal Control Subsystem is among these. From the functional model 
of the subsystem, the functions were collected and used to select entries in the EC matrix. 
Using this EC matrix thus formed, the product-specific function-failure (EFprod) matrix 
was determined. EFprod lists only function-failure pairings that are relevant to the 
particular product. Next, the risk likelihood and consequence calculations were 
performed using the equations as shown in Table 2.1.using EC matrix and component-
failure severity (CF’) matrix. The L1 likelihood mapping is used as a risk assessment in 
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the subsystem design level, whereas L2 mapping is used at the system design level. The 
C1 consequence mapping is used in risk assessments that involve human related 
products, whereas C2 mapping is better suited for unmanned products (Grantham Lough, 
Stone and Tumer, 2009).The pros and cons for each of these mappings are shown in 
Table 2.1. The risk fever chart from the four RED risk assessments performed on thermal 
control subsystem risk assessments are shown in Table 2.3. All the risk assessments 
produced 73 risk elements. Some sample risk elements from Thermal Control Subsystem 
RED risk assessments are shown in Table 2.4. The risk elements contain specific 











Table 2.4. Sample Risk Elements from Thermal Control Subsystem RED Risk 




This work used the principle of the RED method to analyze chemical risk for 




3.  CHEMICAL RED METHOD 
Chemical RED methodology relies on the concept of RED (Grantham Lough, 
Stone and Tumer, 2009) to asses risks associated with chemical components or 
subsystems. In addition, it uses function and the components of the functional basis, and 
adds chemical failure modes to the failure mode taxonomy. The taxonomies permit 
efficient communication of the potential risks in the early phases of product development. 
These risks are then mapped to the risk fever chart, which shows the high-risk, moderate-
risk and low-risk elements using numerical and colored codes. This chapter describes the 
chemical failure modes developed for addition to the electrochemical failure mode 
taxonomy and the steps of the methodology 
 
 
3.1  FAILURE MODE 
Failure mode is defined as the link between failure cause and failure effect, 
(Collins, 1993). Failure modes are the physical, chemical, electrical, mechanical, 
electromagnetic, structural, thermal, or atomic processes that lead to failure. Previous 
work has produced an extensive list of electromechanical failure modes (Uder, Stone and 
Tumer, 2004). Literature review and the definition of failure mode were combined to 
ascertain the causes, failure modes, and effects that describe how chemical components 
or subsystems fail at the elemental, physics-based level. Table 3.1 presents the resulting 
chemical failure mode taxonomy as an addendum to the electromechanical taxonomy. 
 
 





The chemical taxonomy formulation process sought to identify failure modes that 
can be described in terms of the elemental chemistry. New terms added to the taxonomy 
had to be mutually exclusive to prevent overlapping among terms.  
A review of the literature permitted identification of failure effects with chemical 
significance. The failure cause was identified, and the link (the failure mode) derived 
from this relationship. Table 3.2 is a schematic representation of this relationship. 
 
 




If a term overlapped to some degree with an existing term, then the following 
categorization algorithm developed by Uder et al. (2004)was employed: 
1) The new term might be a superset of the existing term it overlaps with, in 
which case the new term might be used as a primary identifier. 
2) The new term might be similar enough to an existing term that it might be 
categorized as a comparable term (synonym) rather than entering it into the 
basis as a new item. 
3) The new term and the term which it overlaps may need to be combined or 
replaced by a slightly broader term. 
4) The new term and/or the term which it overlaps may need to be replaced by a 







Applying these algorithms, this work identified four chemical failure modes to be 
added to the taxonomy. This section briefly defines the chemical failure modes 
presenting the alphabetically by primary identifier in the same order in which they appear 
in the chemical failure mode taxonomy addendum in Table 3.1. Although electrical 
failure modes result in a short or open circuit, chemical failure modes lead to an 
undesirable chemical reaction or process that manifests as degraded performance or a 
total malfunction of device or subsystem. Some electrical failure modes, such as electron 
migration, may also be classified as chemical failure modes because they lead to 
undesirable chemical reactions that degrade performance. 
Some possible failure modes identified by the literature review but eliminated by 
the algorithm include interface failure and microdrop debonding. In the case of interface 
failure, localized bonding of polymer-to-metal and polymer-to-glass have been 
successfully achieved with transmission laser joining technique for the assembly and 
packaging of polymer-based microsystems. Sultana (2007) performed failure mode 
analysis of these bonds by optical microscopy, scanning electron microscopy and atomic 
force microscopy. His work showed that interface failure is dominant in weak joints and 
material failure is predominant in strong joints. Chemical analysis in the joint region, 
performed by x-ray photoelectron spectroscopy, showed that interface failure as a 
mechanism and diffusion as the failure mode in the perceived failure effect (a discolored 
and weak joint). Although Polyvinylidene Fluoride. is a relatively stable polymer, it 
forms comparatively good joint by chemical bonding with titanium and forms titanium 
fluoride and titanium carbide type bonds as titanium diffuses across the bond. (Sultana, 
2007). Therefore diffusion is the failure mode, and interface failure was not included as a 
failure mode. 
Microdrop debonding was noted on silicon carbide-coated carbon fibers in 
aluminum matrix composites. One of the major problems associated with these systems is 
the formation of aluminum carbide at the fiber/matrix interface, which promotes the 
degradation of the fiber’s mechanical properties Both water and oxygen act as catalysts in 
the reaction between aluminum and either carbon or silicon carbide to form aluminum 
carbide in the fiber/matrix interphase region. The microdrop debonding is actually a 
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failure effect of the failure mode catalytic effect and therefore was not included in the 
addendum to the failure mode taxonomy.  
3.1.1. Failure Mode Identified as Catalytic Effect. Catalytic effect is the 
increased or decreased in the rate of a chemical reaction by means of a chemical 
substance known as a catalyst (Jencks, 1969). A catalyst is not consumed by the reaction 
itself but may participate in multiple chemical transformations. Catalysts generally react 
with one or more reactants to form intermediates that subsequently yield the final 
reaction product. Catalytic effect may cause an unintended reaction, which results in the 
reduced performance of a product. An example of this type of failure is in the oxidation 
of silicone. Silicone device fabrication requires the oxidation of silicon. The presence of 
cesium atoms promoted localized oxidation (Ernst and Yu, 1990). This localized 
oxidation leads to failure of these devices  
3.1.2. Failure Mode Identified as Charge Imbalance. Charge imbalance is a 
loss of electrons (which creates a positive charge) or a gain of electrons (producing a 
negative charge). Electrons are added and removed under the influence of elements 
electro negativity. The imbalance charge creates a more reactive chemical species; which 
when such species react successfully it can cause failure in some characteristic of the 
product. For example, in the manufacture of organic light emitting diodes (OLEDs) there 
is a growing consensus that one factor leading to the chemical failure is an imbalance of 
charge carriers in one of the transport layers composing the device. Experiments carried 
out by Knox et al.(2006).suggest that for Tris (8-hydroxyquinoline)aluminum(III) 
(AlQ3)-based devices, degradation is related to an imbalance of charge on the AlQ3 side 
of the heterojunction, resulting in the build-up of cationic AlQ3 species which may be 
less stable and more reactive than the pristine material. Cationic AlQ3 may be more 
susceptible to chemical reactions such as the hydrolysis failure. The luminosity of 
affected OLED’s is compromised. Types of chemical chosen, operating temperature and 
electromagnetic field have an effect on charge imbalance.  
3.1.3. Failure Mode Identified as Diffusion. Diffusion refers to the process by 
which molecules intermingle as a result of their kinetic energy of random motion 
(Zumdahl, 2006). It is a net transport of molecules from a region of higher concentration 
to one of lower concentration by random molecular motion. Fundamentally, two types of 
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diffusion occur: Tracer diffusion a spontaneous mixing of molecules taking place in the 
absence of concentration or chemical potential. Gradient and chemical diffusion occurs in 
the presence of concentration or chemical potential gradient and it results in net transport 
of mass, (Brogioli and Vailat, 2001). Diffusion may bring reactive species closer, 
facilitating an unintended chemical reaction that leads to performance degradation in 
device or subsystem. In the semiconductor industry, tin nitride has been popularly used as 
a diffusion barrier between aluminum and silicone to prevent ‘‘spiking.’’ Spiking has, 
been reported to occurs through tin nitride at temperatures higher than 500 °C. The 
investigation of Al/TiN/Si showed that before spiking occurs, aluminum accumulates at 
the bottom of tin nitride. Silicone also diffuses through tin nitride and dissolves into 
aluminum. The aluminum accumulation at the bottom of tin nitride results in an 
interfacial reaction between aluminum and tin nitride. This produces Al3Ti as a spike.  
3.1.4 Failure Mode Identified as Free Radical Formation. Free radicals are 
atoms, molecules, or ions with unpaired electrons on an otherwise open shell 
configuration. These unpaired electrons are usually highly reactive, so radicals are likely 
to take part in chemical reactions (Housecroft and Sharp, 1999). The formation of 
radicals may involve the breaking of covalent bonds either homolytically, a process that 
requires significant amounts of energy, or by single electron oxidation or reduction of an 
atom or molecule. In a typical fuel cell, hydrogen is delivered to the anode side of the cell 
that contains a catalyst, such as platinum. The platinum splits the hydrogen molecules 
into hydrogen ions and electrons. With a proton exchange membrane in the middle, only 
hydrogen ions can travel through the membrane to the cathode. Electrons travel on a 
different path through the electrical circuit to the cathode, creating an electrical current. 
Fuller’s research shows that the membrane, commonly made of a synthetic polymer, is 
prone to attack by free radicals that create holes in the barrier. The free radicals are 
formed by the decomposition of hydrogen peroxide, a strong oxidizing chemical that can 
form near the membrane (Bi and Fuller, 2008) 
3.1.5 Database Generation. The quality of the outputs of the methodology depends 
largely on the quality of the historical failure data captured. A strong failure knowledge-
base is essential for the generation of reliable estimates of chemical risks. The present 
work investigated 22 failures of a chemical device or subsystem and catalogued the 
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failure information. It included failure of microchips, diodes, fuel cells, polymer 
membranes, nanofibers, adhesive bonds, implanted devices, microelectromechanical 
machines, anodes, packing material, photo voltaic cells, and microbarriers. This small 
database was used for the proof of concept of the method. The data thus extracted was 
combined to build a failure knowledge-base by populating EC CF and CF’ matrices to 
obtain the EF matrix, as described in Equation (1). This method uses RED equations 
exactly. Table 3.3, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 show the matrices. The CF’ matrix uses the failure 
severity values shown in Table 3.7 to map severity. The impact of the failure modes on 
the devices is either explicitly stated in the text or can be inferred from the failure effects 
noted in the case studies.  
 
 




The rows of the EC matrix consists of functions from the functional basis (Hirtz et 
al., 2002), and the column lists components from component taxonomy (Greer, et al., 
2003). The binary entries in this matrix indicate that the functionality has been solved (1) 
or not (0) by the corresponding component. The numbers are either 0 or 1. 0 indicates 
that the function (for instance guide solid) was not carried out by the component (diode, 
micro chip, photovoltaic cell, etc) in the historical catalogued case studies. 1 indicates 
that the function (for instance guide energy) was indeed carried out by the component in 
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the catalogue of historical failures (diode, micro chip, photovoltaic cell, carbon fibers, 
and micro barrier). This matrix is used to calculate the EF matrix, as shown in Equation 
(1), the risk likelihood as shown in Equations (2) and (3), and risk consequence as shown 
in Equations (4) and (5). 
 
 




The CF matrix of the chemical RED method lists components in rows and failure 
modes (from the taxonomy addendum. It is also used in Equations (2) and (3) to calculate 
risk likelihood. The numerical matrix values indicate how many times the component has 
exhibited a failure mode in the 22 cases investigated. For instance, microchips failed four 
times by diffusion, two times by charge imbalance, one time by catalytic effect. They 
never failed by free radical failure modes. This matrix is used to formulate the function-
failure mode EF matrix, as seen in Equation (1). The numerical entries correspond to how 
many times the function has exhibited the corresponding failure mode in the cases that 








The rows and columns of the CF’ is identical to the CF matrix, however, the numerical 
entries represent the severity of the failure as displayed in the severity mapping in Table 
3.7, and range from 0 to 5. For example, for the implanted device, the severity of the 
failure was at 5 for both catalytic effect and charge imbalance. This level of severity 
indicates that failure of the device may cause harm to humans. 
 
 








In the case of AlQ3-based OLEDs, Knox et al. (2006) notes that diodes failed by 
charge imbalance. This information is entered in the CF matrix. Knox et al observed 
reduced intensity of the light emitting diodes, which would correspond to severity value 
of 3 from Failure severity value mapping shown in Table 3.7. This value is entered into 
the CF’ matrix. The diodes functional model is then derived (Stone, Tumer and Van Wie, 
2004). The function failure matrix entry for the failure effect (charge imbalance) and the 
corresponding functions (guide energy) is then provided a value indicating the number of 
times guide energy has failed by charge imbalance. 
 
3.2  APPLYING THE CHEMICAL RED METHOD 
As in the RED method developed by Grantham Lough et al., in the chemical RED 
method feeds the functional requirements into the failure knowledge base to generate a 
list of potential risks. This list helps the novice designer forecast high-risk functions or 
find ways to mitigate specific failures early in the design process. The steps involved in 
are as follows. 
Step 0: Database Population 
An essential requirement of the method is to have a database of historical failure 
data to include chemical failure modes. To generate such a database, a considerable 
number of failures with chemical components or subsystems must be examined. Failure 
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severity is assigned to the failure modes based on impact to system or device 
performance on a 1 to 5 scale, with 5 bearing most severe impact with device posing 
harm to humans. 
The EC and CF matrices, their product (the EF matrix), and the CF’ matrix 
created using the chemical failure cases as described in Section 3.1.5. These matrices 
represent the repository based on chemical failure information and will be used to 
analyze a fuel cell case study. 
Step 1: Determine functions of product under investigation 
To develop a function model of the new design or subsystem, a black box model 
must first be created. The functional model is then derived from the black box model 
according to the methodology of Stone et al. (2004). The functions are used to generate 
the EF matrix as a part of the method, as described in Equation (1). The functionalities 
are expressed in the form of function and flow by using the functional basis function 
taxonomy. For the case study of the fuel cell, the black box model is shown in Table 3.8, 
and in Table 3.9 as the functional model. 
 
 




A fuel cell is an electrochemical conversion device. It produces electricity from fuel (on 
the anode side) and an oxidant (on the cathode side), which react in the presence of an 
electrolyte. This case study analyzes a proton exchange membrane (PEM) fuel cell that 
failed (Stamenkovic and Markovic 2007). The Black Box model shows the overall 
system requirement to generate electric energy. From the black box model, a functional 
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model is derived following Functions Failure Design method (Stone, Tumer and Van 
Wie, 2004).  
 
 




The functions derived are in the boxes, and are in a verb (for example export) 
object (electrical energy) form. For the Fuel Cell case study, the functions are presented 
as Table 3.10. 
 
 




Step 2: Risk Calculations 
The next step is to map the consequence and likelihood mapping. Normally, the 
formulations provided in Equations (2) through (5) are used to attach likelihood and 
consequence data to the potential failures and thus arrive at identifiable risks.  
For the fuel cell case study, only Equations (3) and (4) are used for this purpose. 
Table 3.11 below shows, how Equations (3) and (4) are used in RED and why they are 
used in the fuel cell case study. Given these three elements (EF, C1, and L2), combined 
risk items are identified and quantified. The L2 equation is chosen as devices under study 








The entries in the C1 matrix indicate the consequence of a particular function-
failure combination, and the entries in the L2 matrix indicate the likelihood that a 
particular function will fail by a specific failure mode. By matching data from each of 
these entries, risk statements can then be constructed. Table 3.12 shows the resulting risk 
statement. 
Guide gas fails by the failure mode diffusion with a consequence of 3 and a 






Table 3.12. Risk Statement  
 
 
Step 3: Risk Result Communication 
 The chemical RED method performs risk analysis that yields important 
information for designers, such as the specific failure mode, likelihood, and consequence 
for each function. These three elements must be properly communicated among design 
team members. Visual representation is appealing to engineers, so they are plotted on a 
risk fever chart (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, 1999). The chart allows risk 
statements to be condensed into low-risk; medium-risk; and high-risk elements by 
plotting each of the risk statements according to the coordinates given by C and L 
matrices. In this case the C1 and L2 matrices. The results indicate the overall risk. This 
method was followed to produce the fever chart shown in Table 3.13. 
 
 





The fuel cell studied here showed three moderate-risk items, and four low-risk 
items.  The moderate risk items were transfer energy fails due to diffusion, guide liquid 
fails due to free radical, and guide gas fails due to free radical.  
The purpose of this case study was to validate that the chemical Red method 
identifies failure in an actual case. The fuel cell under study was a hydrogen fuel cell with 
a Nafion polymer proton exchange membrane. Chemical changes in the Nafion
 
membranes were analyzed by X-ray photoelectron spectroscopy (XPS) and clear 
evidence of polymer degradation was observed. Exposure of the membrane to two hours 
of X-ray radiation did not affect the chemical structure of the membrane. However, 
treatment with various Fenton's reagents indicated that the (CF2)n polymer backbone had 
decomposed due to free radical formation. Fluorine and sulfur XPS peak intensity 
decreases were consistent with the detection of fluoride and sulfate ions during test of the 
fuel-cell. The increase in oxygen atom concentration suggests that oxygen-rich moieties 
formed in the membrane after long-term operation. This case study demonstrated that the 
fuel cell indeed failed due to free radical formation failure mode in the Nafion polymer 
proton exchange membrane whose function is to guide liquid and gas in the fuel cell 
(Stamenkovic and Markovic, 2007). 
The chemical RED method indicates that free radical formation is a moderate 
risk, and in the fuel cell case study showed that this was the primary failure mode. It also 
indicated that diffusion due to transfer energy was a moderate risk. In the case study, 
diffusion was identified for a secondary failure mode of a chemical attack of the CF2 
backbone. Fourier transform infrared spectroscopy (FTIR) spectra showed the formation 
of oxygen moieties in the degraded membrane. Two degradation schemes consistent with 
the results observed have been proposed by Stamenkovic and Markovic (2007). Under 
the same experimental conditions, no detectable changes in XPS spectra were found 
between a fresh membrane electrode assembly (MEA) and an MEA after long-term 
operation. These results suggest that degradation occurred mainly within the membrane 
or at the membrane-electrode interface due to diffusion of oxygen-rich moieties. 
Therefore as predicted the fuel cell membrane failed by diffusion, however, this was not 
the main failure. 
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The medium-risk items predicted by the chemical RED method were both evident 
in the actual fuel cell case. The chemical RED method was therefore validated as a useful 





4.  CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The purpose of this paper was to demonstrate a method for assessing the risk 
posed by chemical subsystems. During the early phase of product or process design, there 
are many opportunities to avert risks by making changes to the functions, with minimal 
impact on budget and schedule. The chemical RED method is effective when applied 
early in the preliminary design phase, as demonstrated by the case study. Chemical RED 
predicted that free radical formation and diffusion would present a moderate risk of 
failure. Both were present in the fuel cell case studied, which identified free radical 
formation as a primary failure mode. Four chemical failure modes were identified and 
added to the electrochemical failure mode taxonomy. Potential areas of risk introduced 
by chemical subsystems were determined using historical chemical failure data. The 
current database was developed through the investigation of 22 chemical subsystem 
failure case studies. This small database is used for proof of concept of the method. Many 
more cases must be added to the database to ensure the effectiveness of this methods risk 
assessment. This paper presents the procedure to apply the method to analyze chemical or 
chemical subsystem risk. No prior knowledge of chemical failures is required to use this 
method; one need only be familiar with the functions of the device or product under 
study. This method, proved to be an efficient tool for novice engineers and designers to 
determine chemical risks in the early design stages by identifying potential failures based 
on catalogued historical data.  
Future work on this topic will involve analysis and validation of the current 
database and developing the database to include many more chemical failure case studies. 
Such work will help form a more complete database and thus improve effectiveness of 
this method in risk assessments. In addition, more chemical failure modes need to be 
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